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Bagenstos:

Formalism and Employer Liability Under Title VII
Samuel R. Bagenstos*
Introduction
Most lawyers, law professors, and judges are familiar with two standard
critiques of formalism in legal reasoning.

One is the unacknowledged-

policymaking critique—that formalist reasoning purports to be above judicial
policymaking but instead simply hides the policy decisions offstage.1 The other
is the false-determinacy critique—that formalist reasoning purports to reduce
decision costs in the run of cases by sorting cases into defined categories, but that
instead of going away the difficult questions of application migrate to the choice
of the category in which to place a particular case.2
Last Term’s decision in Vance v. Ball State University3 demonstrates that the
Supreme Court's complex doctrine on employer liability under Title VII amply
deserves each of these critiques. The Court’s formalistic reasoning conceals a
series of unacknowledged, undefended, and dubious policy choices. Those
choices stand behind the Court’s resolution of the question that triggered

*

Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to the editors of
the University of Chicago Legal Forum for inviting me to contribute to its
symposium on the Civil Rights Act at 50 Years, and to the participants at that
symposium for stimulating comments and conversation. I presented an earlier
version of this paper at the Eighth Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in
Labor and Employment Law; thanks to the participants at that colloquium for
their very helpful feedback.
1
One could find hundreds of citations illustrating this critique, but it is present at
least as early as Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
2
For a recent example of the false-determinacy critique, see Joseph William
Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369 (2013).
3
133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
1
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substantial debate within the Court—how to define a “supervisor,” whose
harassing acts trigger employer liability. They also stand behind the perhaps
more important holding, hiding in plain sight, that an employer is liable for
harassment by nonsupervisory coworkers only when the employer is itself
negligent. To the extent that the Court offered any justification for its decision,
that justification was one of crispness and determinacy of application. But, as is
often the case with formalist reasoning, the Court’s promises of crispness and
determinacy were almost transparently false.
In her dissenting opinion in Vance, Justice Ginsburg urged Congress to
overturn the Court’s narrow interpretation of who is a “supervisor.”4 Such an
action would solve some of the problems with the Court’s opinion, but it would
not go far enough. Rather, Congress should reconsider the entire employer
liability structure the Court constructed in the landmark 1998 Faragher and Ellerth
cases.5 Congress might change that structure in a number of ways. The best
approach, I argue, would be to declare employers liable whenever any of their
employees engages in discriminatory harassment in violation of Title VII. Such a
regime would not distinguish between harassment committed by supervisors
and that committed by coworkers. Nor would it give employers the affirmative
defense created by Faragher and Ellerth.

A clean, certain rule of vicarious

employer liability serves the key policies underlying Title VII, and it does so far
better than do the alternatives.
4

See id. at 2466.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
5
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My argument proceeds as follows. Parts I and II discuss the Vance case
itself.

Part I elaborates the unacknowledged-policymaking critique.

Part II

elaborates the false-determinacy critique. I then turn, in Part III, to the question
of how Congress should respond. My goal in this essay is therefore both to
elaborate a critique of the current law and to channel the reformist energy
unleashed by Vance into a more thoroughgoing direction than Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent suggests.
I. The Unacknowledged Policy Choices
The Court granted certiorari in Vance to resolve a conflict in the circuits
regarding who counts as a supervisor for purposes of its Title VII employer
liability doctrine. In its landmark 1998 decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton6
and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,7 the Court made supervisory status a
trigger for a form of vicarious employer liability. If a supervisor committed
discriminatory harassment, the Court held, the employer would be at least
presumptively liable. 8

Where the supervisor accomplished the harassment

through a “tangible employment action”—“a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits”—
the employer would be absolutely liable.9 Where the harassment did not include
such an action, the Court held, the employer would still be presumptively liable

6

524 U.S. 775 (1998).
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
8
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
9
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
7
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but would be entitled to establish, as an affirmative defense, that it “exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior,” and that the employee-plaintiff “unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”10
In adopting a narrow understanding of who counts as a supervisor, the
Vance Court purported to ask what definition “best fits within the highly
structured framework that [Faragher and Ellerth] adopted.”11 But any number of
ways of defining a supervisor might have fit within the “framework” of Faragher
and Ellerth. To decide which of those definitions to adopt required consideration
of why the Court adopted the framework and what definition best fit those
reasons. The Court’s resolution of the definitional question is inconsistent with
what I shall argue is the most attractive understanding of the reasons the Court
adopted the Faragher/Ellerth framework. I discuss these points in Section A.
But the Court’s decision rested on an even more significant—and even
more suppressed—policy judgment. That judgment is the determination that
employers cannot be liable for harassment undertaken by nonsupervisory
coworkers unless the employers are themselves negligent.12 In Faragher and
Ellerth, the Court had assumed that a negligence standard applied in such

10

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2446.
12
What it means for an employer that is not a natural person, but that can act
only through human agents, to itself be negligent is not an easy question, though
the Court has shown no sign of appreciating the point. I discuss this issue in Part
II.
11
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circumstances, but it never held as much—and it certainly never sought to justify
such a holding. In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,13 decided six years after
Faragher and Ellerth, the Court reiterated that it had not decided what standard of
employer liability is appropriate in coworker harassment cases. Vance must be
read as holding for the first time—without announcing the innovation—that
negligence is the standard. Yet the Vance Court never once sought to justify
adopting such a standard, and the arguments against a negligence rule are much
stronger than the arguments for one. I discuss these points in Section B.
A. Defining Supervisor
When the Court granted certiorari in Vance, lower courts had adopted two
distinct approaches for determining who constitutes a supervisor under Title VII.
Some courts had defined a supervisor to embrace anyone who had been
delegated authority by the employer “to exercise significant direction over [the
plaintiff’s] daily work.”14 Other courts, including the Seventh Circuit in Vance
itself, had held that a supervisor must have “the power to hire, fire, demote,
promote, transfer, or discipline the victim”—in other words, the power to carry
out a “tangible employment action.”15
As Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court correctly noted, the plain meaning
of the word “supervisor” could not resolve that disagreement.16 “Supervisor,”
after all, is a term with broader and narrower meanings. In ordinary usage and

13

542 U.S. 129 (2004).
Vance, 133 S. Ct. 2443.
15
Id.
16
See id. at 2444.
14

5
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in the law, the term sometimes embraces any individual who has day-to-day
authority to direct a subordinate’s work, while it sometimes embraces only those
individuals who have hiring and firing authority.17 Moreover, as Justice Alito
also correctly noted, it makes little sense to parse the word “supervisor” “as if [it]
were a statutory term.”18 Congress did not use that word; the Court in Faragher
and Ellerth came up with it “as a label for the class of employees whose
misconduct may give rise to vicarious employer liability.”19
So far, so good.

Having established that the proper definition of

supervisor cannot come simply from textual formalism, the sensible next step for
the Court would have been to look behind the label and ask, based on the
statutory policies that animated Faragher and Ellerth, precisely what is the “class
of employees whose misconduct may give rise to vicarious employer liability.”
If supervisory status distinguishes those employees from the other employees
whose misconduct does not trigger vicarious liability, we might ask what it is
about supervisory status that makes employer liability appropriate. We might
then use that justification as a guide to defining the category of supervisor.
Rather standard, perfectly appropriate legal reasoning.
But that is precisely the road the Vance Court did not take.

Having

rejected formalism of the text as unhelpful and inapposite, the Court sought
solace in a different formalism—the formalism of the “framework.” Rather than
17

See id. at 2444-2446; see also Catherine L. Fisk, Supervisors in a World of Flat
Hierarchies, 64 HAST. L.J. 1403 (2013) (discussing differences of opinion regarding
definition of supervisor under the National Labor Relations Act).
18
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2446.
19
Id.
6
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looking to what definition of the category best fits the reasons why Faragher and
Ellerth held that employers are liable for the acts of their supervisors, the Court
concluded that “the way to understand the meaning of the term ‘supervisor’ for
present purposes is to consider the interpretation that best fits within the highly
structured framework that those cases adopted.” 20 And the Court found it
“implicit in the characteristics of [that] framework” that an individual cannot be
a supervisor unless she has authority to take a “tangible employment action.”21
The implication, the Court suggested, appeared in Ellerth’s statement that
“Tangible employment actions fall within the special province of the
supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a
distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other
employees under his or her control. . . . Tangible employment actions are
the means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the
enterprise to bear on subordinates.”22
“The strong implication of this passage,” the Vance Court concluded, “is that the
authority to take tangible employment actions is the defining characteristic of a
supervisor.”23
But that reading of Faragher and Ellerth is a stretch. In the passage quoted
by the Vance Court, Ellerth was explaining why tangible employment actions
should trigger liability without any possibility that the employer could make out
an affirmative defense.

“When a supervisor makes a tangible employment

decision,” the Ellerth Court explained just before the passage quoted in Vance,
“there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency
20

Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2446.
Id. at 2448.
22
Id. (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (emphasis in Vance)).
23
Id.
21

7
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relation.”24 But to say that we can be certain that the supervisor is aided by the
agency relation when she undertakes a tangible employment action does not at
all imply that a supervisor is not aided by the agency relation when she fails to
undertake—or even lacks power to undertake—such an action. It is a completely
sensible interpretation of the Faragher/Ellerth framework to say that we make
employers

automatically

liable,

with

no

affirmative

defense,

when

discriminatory harassment results in a tangible employment action (because in
such circumstances we know that the supervisor’s action was aided by the
agency relation), but that we make employers liable for harassment by day-today supervisors who lack hiring and firing authority subject to the affirmative
defense (because in those circumstances the harassment will often, but not
always, have been aided by the agency relation, and the affirmative defense will
appropriately sort the cases). As far as the Faragher/Ellerth framework goes, both
the more employer-friendly reading adopted by the Vance Court and the more
employee-friendly reading offered by the plaintiff would have fit.
The definition of supervisor the Court adopted in Vance thus was not
dictated by statutory text or prior precedent. In choosing between a narrow and
a broad definition, the Court was forced to make a policy decision regarding the
extent to which employers should be responsible for the harassing acts of those
employees they put in a position to direct other employees’ work. But the Court
did not acknowledge this policy question, much less seek to defend the choice it
made.
24

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-762.
8
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The Court’s mode of proceeding in Vance contrasts sharply with its
approach in Faragher. Although some commentators have criticized Faragher as
itself driven by a wooden and formalistic analysis,25 that decision contains a
reasonably open and candid discussion of the policy choices the Court was called
upon to make. Following the Court’s prior statement that Congress intended
courts to look to common-law agency principles as a starting point for deciding
the scope of employer liability under Title VII26—a statement it believed to be
confirmed by Congress’s failure to alter the rules for employer liability in the
Civil Rights Act of 199127—the Faragher Court recognized that Congress required
it to craft a liability scheme that implemented these principles while serving the
statute’s underlying policies.28 The Faragher Court focused its analysis on the
principle set forth in Section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
that an employer is liable for torts of an employee who was “aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”29
In determining that supervisors who harass are generally aided by the
existence of their relationship with the employer, the Court focused on two

25

See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies:
Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 755 (1999); Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title
VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41
(1999); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of
Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3 (2003)
(describing formalism of lower courts’ interpretation of Faragher and Ellerth).
26
See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
27
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792.
28
See id. at 802 n.3, 805-807.
29
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801-808. Note that the current Restatement no longer
includes this language. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2441 n.2.
9
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salient points.

First, the “agency relation affords contact with an employee

subjected to a supervisor’s [discriminatory] harassment.”30 But that alone, the
Ellerth Court explained the same day, would not be enough for employer
liability. 31 Second, and crucially, a supervisor’s power to retaliate against
employees who complain about harassment may well make the victim “reluctant
to accept the risks of blowing the whistle on a superior”:
When a person with supervisory authority discriminates in the terms and
conditions of subordinates’ employment, his actions necessarily draw
upon his superior position over the people who report to him, or those
under them, whereas an employee generally cannot check a supervisor's
abusive conduct the same way that she might deal with abuse from a coworker.32
The Ellerth Court similarly observed that “a supervisor’s power and authority
invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character, and
in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by the agency relation.”33
The Faragher and Ellerth Court did not stop simply by noting the ways in
which a supervisor’s conduct generally draws, if only implicitly, on the agency
relation with the employer. The Court in those cases believed that it could not
pursue that argument to its logical limit, and make employers vicariously liable
for all of the harassing conduct committed by their supervisors, for three reasons.
First, the Court pointed to its earlier statement in Meritor that employers are not
“always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors.”34 This

30

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.
See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
32
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.
33
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
34
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69-70.
31

10
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statement, Faragher and Ellerth concluded, was a holding—and one with strong
stare decisis effect because Congress left it intact while making other changes to
Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.35 Second, Ellerth explained, “there may
be some circumstances where the supervisor’s status makes little difference” to
her accomplishment of the harassment. 36 Finally, both Faragher and Ellerth
emphasized that the Court must take account of what it called “the statutory
policy” of preventing, rather than simply compensating for, discrimination, as
well as the “equally obvious policy” of encouraging victims of discrimination to
mitigate damages.37 The Court’s ultimate holding regarding the standards for
employer liability reflected an unabashed balancing of these different policy
considerations, as the Court made clear in the paragraph that it repeated
verbatim in both Faragher and Ellerth.38
35

See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 & n.4.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
37
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
38
The paragraph reads:
In order to accommodate the agency principles of vicarious liability for
harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII’s
equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and
saving action by objecting employees, we adopt the following holding . . . .
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate
(or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had
promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy
36

11
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How might the Vance Court have addressed the question of defining a
supervisor consistent with the mode of analysis in Faragher and Ellerth?

In

keeping with Faragher and Ellerth’s conclusion that harassment by supervisors is
often aided by the agency relation because its victims fear retaliation, the Court
might have asked, as an empirical matter, what are the acts a supervisory
employee could take that would make a threat of retaliation effective.
Alternatively, the Court might have asked whether a particular definition of
supervisor would serve or disserve the statutory policies of prevention and
encouraging victims to mitigate damages.
But the Vance Court did not engage any of these questions. The Court did
assert, in a single sentence, that “[i]t is because a supervisor has th[e] authority
[“to inflict direct economic injury”]—and its potential use hangs as a threat over
the victim—that vicarious liability (subject to the affirmative defense) is
justified.”39 There can be no doubt that the power to inflict direct economic
injury is one mode by which a superior employee can retaliate against an
individual who complains about harassment. The Faragher Court itself pointed

suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And
while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation
of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy
the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense. No
affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as
discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-808; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-765.
39
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448.
12
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to the power “’to hire and fire’” as one of the characteristics that make it difficult
for a worker to “check a supervisor’s abusive conduct the same way that she
might deal with abuse from a coworker.”40 But Faragher also referred to the
authority “’to set work schedules’” as one of the means by which a supervisor
might effectively retaliate.41 And the Court’s own Title VII retaliation cases have
recognized that employers can effectively deter complaints about discrimination
even if they take actions that fall well short of tangible employment actions. In
Burlington Northern v. White,42 the Court expressly rejected any limitation of Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provisions “to so-called ‘ultimate employment decisions.’”43
Rather, the Court recognized that a broader array of employment actions—
including schedule changes, exclusion from training lunches, and the like—will
deter employees from complaining about discrimination. 44

The Burlington

Northern Court specifically held that a “reassignment of duties” can constitute
retaliation even where “both the former and present duties fall within the same
job description.” 45

Because “[a]lmost every job category involves some

responsibilities that are less desirable than others,” the Court explained, “one
good way to discourage an employee . . . from bringing discrimination charges

40

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (quoting Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV.
813, 854 (1991)).
41
Id. (quoting Estrich, supra note 40, at 854).
42
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
43
Id. at 67.
44
See id. at 69.
45
Id. at 70.
13
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would be to insist that she spend more time performing the more arduous
duties.”46
The Vance Court did not engage with, much less dispute, this point.47 And
the Court could hardly have denied that the power of a superior employee to
make day-to-day assignments of work can effectively deter the victim of
harassment from complaining.

Instead, the Court must have implicitly

concluded that the cost of employer liability for harassment committed by
employees who lack the power to hire and fire outweighs the additional
protection that employer liability would give those victims who are deterred
from complaining by a superior employee’s ability to make work assignments.
But the Court never even acknowledged, much less sought to justify, that choice.
And the Court’s implicit policy choice was a dubious one at best.
Extensive sociological and psychological evidence demonstrates that people who
complain about harassment and discrimination provoke “widespread dislike”
and “pervasive[] . . . retaliation” within their workplaces.48 This dislike and
retaliation is a key deterrent that keeps individuals from taking action to stop
discrimination and harassment perpetrated against them.49 The evidence does
not suggest that the likelihood or effectiveness of retaliation depends on the
formal job duties of the harasser. Rather, as Deborah Brake shows in her review
46

Id. at 70-71.
It is notable that Justice Alito, who wrote the Court’s opinion in Vance, rejected
the Court’s analysis in Burlington Northern. See id. at 73 (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment).
48
Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a RightsClaiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 902-903 (2008).
49
See id. at 904.
47

14
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of the literature, the likelihood and effectiveness of retaliation depends much
more on the relative status of the perpetrator and the target within an
institution.50 Because designation as a supervisor is one index of higher status
within an organization, targets of harassment perpetrated by individuals who
are so designated can legitimately fear retaliation, regardless of whether the
supervisors have the power to take “tangible employment actions” as defined in
Faragher and Ellerth. As I argue below, the same sociological and psychological
evidence suggests that the Court should not draw a firm line between
supervisors and coworkers for purposes of triggering employer liability. But
assuming such a line makes sense, there are substantial reasons to doubt that the
line should be drawn at the place where an individual has the power to take a
tangible employment action.51
B. Making Negligence the Baseline Rule
But there is even a more significant aspect to the Vance holding. That is
the Court’s conclusion that an employer is liable for the discriminatory
harassment of nonsupervisory employees only if the employer is itself negligent.
This aspect of the holding was a bit hidden, because it was not the basis for the
disagreement between the majority and the dissent. But it was hiding in plain
sight. There can be no doubt after Vance that employers are liable for harassment
perpetrated by nonsupervisory workers only if the employers themselves are
negligent. As the Vance Court squarely stated, “[n]egligence provides the better

50
51

See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 40-42 (2005).
See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2454-2466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
15

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

15

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 93 [2013]

framework for evaluating an employer’s liability when a harassing employee
lacks the power to take tangible employment actions.”52 But the Court made no
effort to justify this aspect of its holding—in Vance or in any of its earlier cases—
and the arguments for it are weak.
In its pre-Vance cases the Court never held that a negligence standard of
employer liability applied to coworker-on-coworker harassment. Faragher, to be
sure, seemed to assume that a negligence standard applied in such circumstances.
In holding that supervisors who harass are not always acting in the scope of their
employment, the Faragher Court pointed to the “uniform[]” view of lower courts
that “co-worker harassment” was to be “judged under a negligence standard.”53
The Court found it “quite unlikely that these cases would escape efforts to render
them obsolete if we were to hold that supervisors who engage in discriminatory
harassment are necessarily acting within the scope of their employment.”54 But
the Faragher Court offered no affirmative argument that coworker harassment
should be assessed under a negligence standard.55 Any such argument would
have been dicta in any event.

Faragher, like Ellerth, was a case involving

harassment by a supervisor, not a coworker, so the standard of employer liability
for coworker harassment was not squarely presented. And in its only discussion
of the issue between Faragher/Ellerth and Vance, the Court expressly stated that
the standard for coworker harassment remained an open question: “Ellerth and

52

Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799.
54
Id. at 800.
55
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 769; Harper, supra note 25, at 53.
53

16
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Faragher expressed no view on the employer liability standard for co-worker
harassment. Nor do we.”56
Although the Court had at best assumed that a negligence standard
applies to coworker harassment—and had never offered a substantive defense of
that proposition—the Vance Court treated negligence as the undisputed baseline
rule for employer liability. Thus, Vance began its discussion of employer liability
standards by stating that “we have held that an employer is directly liable for an
employee’s unlawful harassment if the employer was negligent with respect to
the offensive behavior,” but that Faragher and Ellerth “held that different rules
apply where the harassing employee is the plaintiff’s ‘supervisor.’”57 And it later
referred to Faragher and Ellerth as having “created a special rule for cases
involving harassment by ‘supervisors.’”58
That is simply an incorrect statement of what Faragher and Ellerth held. As
I have shown, those cases did not hold that negligence is the baseline standard
for employer liability under Title VII, but that “special rules” apply where
supervisors do the discriminating. Because those cases involved discrimination
undertaken by people who were concededly supervisors, the question of
employer liability for nonsupervisors’ conduct was simply not presented. All the

56

Suders, 542 U.S. at 143 n.6.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2441 (emphasis added). To support its statement that the
Court had “held” that negligence is the baseline standard, the Vance Court cites
page 789 of the Faragher opinion. See id. But on that page, Faragher does nothing
more than discuss the lower-court decisions applying a negligence standard. See
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789. Although the Faragher Court may have assumed that
those decisions were correct, it never held as much.
58
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2442 (emphasis added).
57

17
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Court decided was that, where supervisors are the harassers, the employer is
vicariously liable (subject to an affirmative defense in the absence of a tangible
employment action). Although the Court may have assumed that negligence was
the standard in other contexts, it had never held as much—as the Court itself
noted in Suders.
Vance thus marks the first time the Court held that a negligence standard
applies to discriminatory harassment committed by a nonsupervisory coworker.
One would think that the Court would have felt the need to offer some
substantive defense of the negligence standard in terms of the policies that
underlie Title VII. But Vance offered no such defense. To be sure, the Court
sought to parry Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion in dissent that negligence leaves
victims of harassment without a remedy59—a parry that, as I discuss below, was
not especially persuasive—but the Court made absolutely no effort to show that
a negligence standard best serves the statutory policies and purposes.
Any such effort would have been extremely challenging, for at least two
reasons. First, most of the policy rationales offered by the Faragher and Ellerth
Court for employer liability for supervisors’ actions (subject to the affirmative
defense) suggest that employer liability is appropriate on the same terms for
coworkers’ actions.

As Professor Harper argued shortly after Faragher and

Ellerth, “[t]he prevention-based cost internalization [argument], as well as the
remediation arguments for employer liability for co-worker discriminatory

59

See id. at 2453; id. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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harassment, are as strong as those for employer liability for supervisory
harassment.”60
The Faragher Court, to be sure, noted two distinctions between supervisors
and other employees that seem relevant here—notably “that supervisors have
special authority enhancing their ability to harass, and that the employer can
guard against their misbehavior more easily because their numbers are by
definition fewer than the numbers of regular employees.”61 But there is less to
these distinctions than initially appears.

The suggestion that supervisors’

conduct is generally easier for employers to monitor is empirically dubious, as
many supervisors will have greater opportunities than other coworkers to
commit harassing acts out of the sight of witnesses. 62 The other possible
distinction is stronger but not, I think, sufficient. Supervisors do have special
power to harass, because of their ability to threaten retaliation. But the difference
between supervisors and ordinary employees in this regard is one of degree
rather than kind. As Professor Harper noted, there are many circumstances in
which the victim of harassment will rationally fear retaliation for reportion the
violation even when the perpetrator is not a supervisor.63 The harasser may be a
top income producer for the employer, for example, or otherwise have higher

60

Harper, supra note 25, at 82; see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 757
(arguing that strict vicarious liability “advances the goals of the civil rights laws”
by promoting deterrence and compensation). For further discussion of the policy
question of what rule of employer liability makes sense, see Part III below.
61
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 800-801.
62
See Harper, supra note 25, at 83 n.155.
63
See id. at 83-84.
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status in the company than does the victim. 64 As Professor Brake’s work
demonstrates, these kinds of status differences, and not the formal lines of
authority, are likely to be key in promoting retaliation.65
Alternatively, the victim may simply fear that an employer that has not
implemented an effective policy against harassment will respond negatively to
complaints regarding the discrimination it has tolerated. If, as Professor Schultz
argues, much harassment aims to enforce pre-existing workplace norms of
segregation,66 this fear will be particularly rational.67 And as for the other policies
identified by Faragher—prioritizing prevention over compensation, and
encouraging victims to mitigate damages—vicarious liability plus the affirmative
defense serves these policies just as well in the coworker context as in the
supervisor context.
Second, contrary to the Court’s protestations, a negligence standard will
leave many employees without a remedy when their coworkers harass them in
ways that violate Title VII. One wonders why the Court even protested. After
all, the whole point of adopting a negligence standard instead of a standard of
64

This may be true for third-party or customer harassment as well. See, e.g.,
Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 505 (2011) (describing testimony in one
case against a drug company “regarding a firm culture that permitted and
tolerated sexual advances by doctors on the female sales representatives”).
65
See Brake, supra note 50, at 40-41.
66
See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998);
see also Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 817, 838-841 (2005) (reviewing evidence demonstrating that the
predictors of harassment are organizational, rather than individual, in nature).
67
See Brake, supra note 50, at 41-42 (explaining that retaliation is particularly
prevalent in workplaces “with a high tolerance for, and incidence of,
discrimination”).
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strict liability is to limit the circumstances in which employers will be liable for
the wrongful actions of their employees.68 And, under Title VII, employers are
the only potential defendants in town. 69

If the victims of discriminatory

harassment cannot recover from their employers, they cannot recover at all for a
violation of their rights under Title VII. Moreover, there is a substantial and
unresolved question whether the victim of discriminatory harassment could
recover damages in any event, even if she could prove that her employer was
negligent. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which authorized the award of damages
for violations of Title VII, limits such awards to cases “against a respondent who
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination.” 70 Although discriminatory
harassment is a form of intentional discrimination,71 the respondent in Title VII
cases is the employer.

Where the employer is vicariously liable for an

employee’s discrimination (as in Faragher), it seems to follow that the
discriminating employee’s intent should be imputed to the employer, and that
the victim can therefore recover damages. But where the employer is liable
directly for its own negligence—whatever “its own negligence” means—the
argument that the employer itself “engaged” in intentional discrimination (as
required for a damages remedy under the Civil Rights Act of 1991) seems much

68

This is not to deny that there might be good reasons for limiting employer
liability—though the Vance Court did not offer any—but is simply to say that the
inevitable result of a rule limiting employer liability is less employer liability.
69
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 763-764 (collecting cases).
70
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1).
71
See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-80 (1998).
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more dicey.72 Victims of coworker harassment thus may be limited—even if they
can prove employer negligence—to declaratory and injunctive relief, and
backpay only in cases of actual or constructive discharge.73 The Vance Court’s
protests that negligence does not leave employees without a remedy thus seem
doubly flawed.
The discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 suggests a third possible
problem with the adoption of a negligence standard: Holding an employer liable
for its own negligence fits uneasily with the formal structure the Supreme Court
has erected for Title VII claims. The Court has created two distinct frameworks
for bringing and adjudicating race and sex discrimination claims under the
statute: disparate treatment and disparate impact.74 A disparate treatment claim
72

The argument for damages liability would be that the negligence rule is not a
rule of direct liability for the employer’s “own” conduct but rather an attribution
rule that determines when a nonsupervisory worker’s intentional discrimination
will be attributed to the employer. An employer, then, has “engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination,” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), whenever it has been
negligent with respect to the unlawful intentional discrimination of its
employees. There is nothing wrong with that argument as a formal matter. But
one should not place much hope for a broad interpretation of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 in a Court that is as willing as was the Vance Court to read the definition
of supervisor narrowly to limit employer liability.
73
See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g); Suders, 542 U.S. at 141-143.
74
See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-578 (2009). Title VII’s text does
create special rules, for particular forms of discrimination, that fall outside of
these two frameworks. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), for example,
provides that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The Court has made clear that this language must be enforced
as written, and it has not tried hard to shoehorn the language into either the
disparate-treatment or the disparate-impact category. See International Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204-205 (1991). Similarly, Title VII’s religion
provisions require an employer to “reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice” so long as there is no
22
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requires proof of what we often call discriminatory intent—that the defendant
treated the plaintiff adversely because of race or sex.75 A disparate impact claim
requires proof that some policy or practice implemented by the employer has a
substantial adverse effect on a class of employees defined by race or sex, though
the employer can defend against such a claim by showing that the practice is jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.76 The Court has characterized
discriminatory harassment claims as a form of disparate treatment, because the
harasser targets an employee because of her race or sex.77 But if the harasser’s
intent is not attributed to the employer through vicarious liability doctrine, it is
difficult to see how the employer should be liable for intentional discrimination
simply on proof of negligence.
Professor Zatz argues that Title VII’s protection against harassment by
individuals (like customers, contractors, and, after Vance, coworkers) whose acts
do not trigger vicarious liability is best understood as a reasonable
accommodation requirement. 78 Professor Zatz’s argument fits well with the
baseline negligence rule adopted by the Court in Vance. But it fits poorly with
Title VII’s text, which expressly imposes a reasonable accommodation

“undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j). As with the PDA, the Court has applied this provision according to its
text, without attempting to fit it into the disparate-treatment or the disparateimpact category. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71-76
(1977).
75
See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577.
76
See id. at 577-578.
77
See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78-81.
78
See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation,
and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (2009).
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requirement only in religion cases.79 A better reading of Title VII, I suggest,
would be to hold the employer responsible whenever discriminatory harassment
by anyone—supervisor, coworker, contractor, customer, or third party—is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment.
An act of harassment cannot violate Title VII unless it so alters terms and
conditions,80 and I would contend that discriminatory terms and conditions are
properly attributed to the employer. But whether or not one agrees with that
argument, the important point for my purposes is that the Court did not engage
with—or even acknowledge—these complexities.
In the end, Vance’s adoption of a negligence rule for coworker harassment,
combined with the case’s narrow definition of who constitutes a supervisor,
seems to be driven by an unstated sense that discriminatory harassment is
typically a deviant act. At least presumptively, the Court seems to believe,
employees who harass other employees do so for their own individual
purposes—purposes that are not shared by, and cannot be attributed to, the
enterprise.81 This point has been a theme of the Court’s opinions since Faragher
and Ellerth. Declaring a “general rule” that “sexual harassment by a supervisor
is not conduct within the scope of employment,” Ellerth stated that “[t]he
harassing supervisor often acts for personal motives, motives unrelated and even
antithetical to the objectives of the employer.”

82

Faragher, with more

79

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
81
For a discussion of how widespread is this understanding of harassment in the
courts and elsewhere, see Lawton, supra note 66.
82
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757.
80
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handwringing, said much the same thing.83 The Court’s recent decision in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes84 also paints discrimination by lower-level supervisors
as deviant and not attributable to the employer.85
But there is good reason to doubt that discriminatory harassment is really
so deviant. As Professor Schultz and others have shown, sexual harassment—
like racial harassment—often seeks to defend and reinforce pre-existing
workplace hierarchies and norms.86 If discriminatory harassment persists in a
workplace to the extent that it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms
and conditions of employment, one can reasonably conclude that it serves the
employer’s own perceived interests. Otherwise, the employer would not tolerate
its continuation.
In any event, the Vance Court left all of these policy judgments implicit. In
concluding that employers could be liable for coworker harassment only if the
employers were themselves negligent, the Court failed to confront any of these
questions. Its decision thus rests on unacknowledged, undefended, and quite
dubious policy judgments.

83

See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-801.
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
85
See id. at 2554 (“To the contrary, left to their own devices most managers in any
corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex
discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring
and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all. Others may choose to
reward various attributes that produce disparate impact—such as scores on
general aptitude tests or educational achievements. And still other managers
may be guilty of intentional discrimination that produces a sex-based disparity.”)
(citation omitted).
86
See sources cited in note 66, supra.
84
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II. The False Determinacy
To the extent that the Vance Court offered a rationale for choosing the
definition of supervisor it picked, that rationale had nothing to do with the
statutory policies identified in Faragher and Ellerth: prevention of harassment,
protection against retaliation, and encouraging the mitigation of damages.
Rather, it rested on the supposed ease of application of the Court’s preferred
definition. The definition of supervisor proposed by the plaintiff and the EEOC,
by contrast, was one that the Court believed was not easy to apply.
The Court made these points so often that workability is easily the
dominant theme of the Court’s opinion. Thus, the Court argued that the EEOC’s
definition “would make the determination of supervisor status depend on a
highly case specific evaluation of numerous factors.”87 It dismissed the EEOC’s
definition as “nebulous,”
ambiguity”

91

—indeed,

88

not

“abstract,”
just

89

“ill-defined,”

ordinary

90

ambiguity

and “a study in
but

“remarkable

ambiguity.”92 The Court also said that “[t]he Seventh Circuit’s understanding of
the concept of a ‘supervisor,’ with which we agree, is easily workable,” while the
“alternative, in many cases, would frustrate judges and confound jurors.”93 The
Court expanded on the point later in the opinion:

87

Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443.
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 2449.
92
Id. at 2450.
93
Id. at 2444.
88
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The interpretation of the concept of a supervisor that we adopt today is
one that can be readily applied. In a great many cases, it will be known
even before litigation is commenced whether an alleged harasser was a
supervisor, and in others, the alleged harasser’s status will become clear to
both sides after discovery. And once this is known, the parties will be in a
position to assess the strength of a case and to explore the possibility of
resolving the dispute. Where this does not occur, supervisor status will
generally be capable of resolution at summary judgment.94
The ability to resolve the question of supervisor status before trial, the Court
explained, was a crucial advantage of the definition it adopted.95
There are two essential problems with the Court’s analysis on this point.
First, the Court far overstated the determinacy of its definition of supervisor—
and the ability of that definition to avoid difficult jury questions. The Court
spoke of the “authority to inflict direct economic injury” as if that “authority”
was a unitary thing that either exists or does not.96 Indeed, it insisted that “those
possessing the authority to effect a tangible change in a victim’s terms or
conditions of employment” made up “a unitary category of supervisors.”97 But a
shrinking proportion of employers adopt a hierarchical model of supervision in
94

Id. at 2449.
See id. at 2450:
Under the definition of “supervisor” that we adopt today, the question of
supervisor status, when contested, can very often be resolved as a matter
of law before trial. The elimination of this issue from the trial will focus
the efforts of the parties, who will be able to present their cases in a way
that conforms to the framework that the jury will apply. The plaintiff will
know whether he or she must prove that the employer was negligent or
whether the employer will have the burden of proving the elements of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. Perhaps even more important, the
work of the jury, which is inevitably complicated in employment
discrimination cases, will be simplified. The jurors can be given
preliminary instructions that allow them to understand, as the evidence
comes in, how each item of proof fits into the framework that they will
ultimately be required to apply.
96
Id. at 2448.
97
Id. at 2443.
95

27
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

27

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 93 [2013]

which the hiring and firing authority resides in a single “unitary” person or
category.98 As Professor Sperino notes, “[i]n many instances, one individual is
not responsible for employment decisions,” but “multiple individuals” instead
“act either independently or as a group to make a final decision.”99 In such
circumstances, the person who has the titular authority to make the tangible
employment action will often rely to a large extent on the evaluations,
recommendations, or actions of other employees.

In workplaces like these,

courts have found it quite difficult to determine who counts as the
decisionmaker for Title VII purposes.100 Even the Supreme Court’s own effort to
address the issue in Staub v. Proctor Hospital101 “left a number of unanswered
questions” regarding the scope of employer liability in circumstances where
multiple employees contribute to an ultimate employment decision.102
The Court recognized this problem, but its response fatally undermined
the claim that its supervisor definition was workable and readily applied at
summary judgment.

The Court explained that if an employer “confine[s]

decisionmaking power to a small number of individuals, those individuals will
98

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2006). For a good general discussion, see
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 67-116 (2004).
99
Sandra F. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title VII, 61
ALA. L. REV. 773, 788-789 (2010).
100
See Steven F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat’s Paw:
Delineating the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination
Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383 (2008).
101
131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
102
Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431,
1448 (2012); see also Theresa M. Beiner, Subordinate Bias Liability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 89, 105-107 (2012) (detailing these unanswered questions).
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have a limited ability to exercise independent discretion” when undertaking a
tangible employment action; they will thus “likely rely on other workers who
actually interact with the affected employee.”103 “Under those circumstances,”
the Court allowed, “the employer may be held to have effectively delegated the
power to take tangible employment actions to the employees on whose
recommendations it relies.”104
This “effectively delegated” standard is every bit as “nebulous,”
“abstract,” and “ill-defined”—and “depend[ent] on a highly case specific
evaluation of numerous factors”—as was the definition of supervisor that the
Vance Court rejected. But when Justice Ginsburg’s dissent suggested that the
Court’s rule was itself ambiguous, 105 the Court responded with simply an
authoritative-sounding epithetic assertion (“it is indisputable that our holding is
orders of magnitude clearer than the nebulous standard [the dissent] would
adopt”) combined with a wave of the hand (“[e]mployment discrimination cases
present an almost unlimited number of factual variations, and marginal cases are
inevitable under any standard”).106 Those responses are hardly sufficient. It is
far from “indisputable” that the “effectively delegated” standard the Court
adopted is at all easier for a judge or jury to grasp than is the authority-to-directdaily-work standard that the Court rejected. And far from being “marginal
cases,” circumstances in which multiple individuals have a role in the ultimate

103

Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452.
Id.
105
See id. at 2462 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449 n.12.
104
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employment decision are extremely common. The Court’s decision thus will
predictably lead to uncertainty in practice—exactly the opposite of what the
Court purported to seek.
Second, if ease of application by judges and juries is the key interest, the
Court could have served that interest much more readily by simply adopting the
same employer liability standard for supervisory and co-worker harassment. By
imposing different standards of liability depending on whether the harasser is a
supervisor or an ordinary co-worker, the Court’s decision requires judges and
juries first to determine how to characterize the harasser before moving on to
decide the merits of the harassment claim. If the Court had simply held that the
employer is liable for discriminatory harassment perpetrated by any employee, it
could have avoided this extra step—and the uncertainty and difficulties of
application that it creates.
To be sure, the Court could equalize the standard for supervisory and coworker harassment in two different ways.

It could level up (by making

employers vicariously liable for the harassment of any employee) or level down
(by limiting an employer’s liability for harassment to negligence in any case).
For all the reasons set forth in the previous Part, however, a rule of vicarious
liability serves the statutory policies better than does a negligence rule.
Moreover, it is striking that the Court, so critical of standards that “depend on a
highly case specific evaluation of numerous factors” when rejecting the EEOC’s
definition of supervisor, 107 ultimately adopted a negligence rule.
107

Indeed, in

Id. at 2443.
30
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parrying the dissent’s argument that its standard would leave victims
unprotected, the Vance Court itself emphasized the numerous case-specific
factors that a jury should consider under it: “the jury should be instructed that
the nature and degree of authority wielded by the harasser is an important factor
to be considered in determining whether the employer was negligent.”108 The
Court explained that “[t]he nature and degree of authority possessed by
harassing employees varies greatly,” and it argued that that the negligence
standard is well suited “to deal with the variety of situations that will inevitably
arise.”109 And the Court went on to state that “[e]vidence that an employer did
not monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a
system for registering complaints, or effectively discouraged complaints from
being filed would be relevant” to the determination whether the employer was
negligent.110 That’s a lot of case-specific factors for a Court that doesn’t want
judges and juries to have to engage in “a highly case specific evaluation of
numerous factors”!
If anything, I have understated the uncertainties in applying a negligence
standard of employer liability. That standard makes an employer liable for “its
own” negligence, but what does it mean for the employer itself to be negligent?
Unless the employer is an individual, an employer cannot act on “its own.” It
can act only through its agents.111 To apply a rule that says that an employer is
108

Id. at 2451.
Id. at 2451-2452.
110
Id. at 2453.
111
See, e.g., Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 759 (“Employer liability is a
problem in any cause of action that creates liability of an entity because the
109
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liable for “its own” negligence thus requires a determination of which acts, by
which agents, the law will treat as the employer’s “own” acts. But the Vance
Court offers absolutely no guidance on how to go about making this
determination. Surely the category of an employer’s own acts is not limited to
official resolutions of a corporation’s board112 or even the acts of employees who
serve in such high-level positions that they may be understood as the alter ego of
the corporation.113 If the category were so limited, any sizeable enterprise would
be effectively immune from claims of coworker harassment, because it would be
very unlikely that the highest-level officials of such enterprises would or should
know about harassment taking place among rank-and-file employees. Instead,
the category of the employer’s own acts must extend to the acts of some lowerlevel supervisory personnel.

And, indeed, the Faragher Court expressed

approval of lower-court decisions that found employers liable for coworker
harassment in cases where supervisors knew about the harassment but did
nothing about it. 114 But is it enough that any supervisor (under the Vance
definition of supervisor) knew about and failed to stop the harassment? Or is
employer negligence liability limited to acts and omissions by those supervisors

entity-defendant is not a living person and it does not act except through the
living persons who work for it.”).
112
Cf. Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405-406 (1997) (formal
decision by a city council is an act of the city itself that triggers municipal liability
under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
113
Cf. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789 (describing “the president of the corporate
employer” as “indisputably within that class of an employer organization’s
officials who may be treated as the organization’s proxy”).
114
See id. (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F. 2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Gus
Constr. Co., 842 F. 2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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who should know about and take steps to stop acts of harassment? If the latter,
how are we to determine what class of supervisors should know about those
acts? Is this simply a matter for the trier of fact to decide, taking into account all
of the circumstances? The Court’s strong reliance on a negligence standard of
employer liability sits extremely uneasily with its emphatic rejection of standards
that require juries to make highly fact-specific determinations.
In short, the Vance majority promised that its formalist approach would
afford more determinacy than would alternative rules. But, as is often the case
with formal rules, the promise of determinacy was a false one.
III. The Path Forward
In her dissenting opinion in Vance, Justice Ginsburg called on Congress
“to correct the error into which this Court has fallen, and to restore the robust
protections against workplace harassment the Court weakens today.”115 Justice
Ginsburg has a successful track record in such calls for Congress to overturn the
Court’s restrictive civil rights decisions.116 Given current partisan alignments in
the House and Senate, she is less likely to be successful this time.117 Nonetheless,
Vance presents an important opportunity to rethink the employer liability
structure the Supreme Court has created for workplace harassment. Even if
Congress is unlikely to overturn Vance in the near term, it is important for civil

115

Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
117
See, e.g., THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012); Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political
Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205 (2013).
116
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rights advocates to plan now for the moment when an opportunity arises. And
Vance has, as I argued above, exposed deep flaws in the Court’s employer
liability doctrine.
But it would be a shame if any effort to overturn Vance were limited to the
Court’s definition of employer.

As I have argued, reliance on a distinction

between supervisors and coworkers for purposes of employer liability will itself
undermine key statutory policies. Coworker harassment frequently draws on
the implicit sanction of the employer and carries with it the implicit threat of
retaliation against those who complain. Applying a lesser standard of employer
liability to coworker harassment thus threatens the policy, recognized in Faragher
and Ellerth, of protecting employees against harassment that is made more
powerful by workplace norms that support the harassers.
Applying different standards to coworker and supervisory harassment
also undermines the statutory policy, emphasized in Vance itself, of clarity and
ease of administration. Because the lines of authority in modern workplaces are
often so complex and overlapping, the determination whether a harasser is
properly characterized as a supervisor or a mere coworker will in a wide array of
cases be uncertain and require extensive litigation. As Justice Alito explained in
his Vance majority, this was true of the supervisor definition pressed by the
EEOC and Justice Ginsburg.118 And, as I have shown, it is also true of the
definition Justice Alito’s majority opinion itself adopted. Particularly because
supervisory status—however defined—at best only loosely correlates with the
118

See supra Part II.
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statutory policies that justify employer liability, there is no good reason to create
the uncertainty and litigation that would attend to making that status a trigger
for liability.
It is not enough, however, simply to eliminate Vance’s distinction between
supervisors and coworkers. Any congressional effort to revisit employer liability
standards under Title VII should confront the problems that have emerged with
the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. There is a substantial argument that
Congress should eliminate that defense entirely. When it created the defense, the
Court justified it as serving two important policies: encouraging employers to
adopt measures that prevent, and do not merely compensate for, discrimination;
and encouraging employees to mitigate damages by reporting, and therefore
helping bring to an end, discrimination against them.119 But experience shows
that the Faragher/Ellerth defense has not served these interests in practice.
As for encouraging preventive action by employers, a rule of strict
vicarious liability should serve the policy at least as well as the Faragher/Ellerth
rule of vicarious-liability-plus-an-affirmative-defense-of-reasonableness.

A

standard justification of strict liability is that, so long as it imposes liability on the
cheapest cost avoider, it will encourage parties to take the efficient level of
precautions.120 If an employer is forced to internalize the costs of discriminatory
harassment committed by its employees, it will, on standard economic theory,
invest in precautions up to the point where they are no longer cost justified. And
119

See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-807.
For a classic statement of the point, see Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff,
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
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the certainty that the employer will be required to internalize those costs sends a
clearer deterrent signal than does a negligence rule (or the Faragher/Ellerth rule
of strict liability with a non-negligence defense), which subjects the parties to the
risk that a trier of fact will err in determining what precautions are in fact cost
justified.121
Rip Verkerke agrees that a rule of strict vicarious liability makes sense in
cases in which harassment is systemic within a workplace.122 Consistent with the
analysis I have offered above, he also would not distinguish between
supervisory and coworker conduct in triggering employer liability.123 But he
argues that, in cases of individual harassment, liability should turn on actual or
constructive notice to the employer (because the target of the harassment in such
cases has information that is not available to the employer without the
employer’s taking unduly costly steps to acquire it).124 One can accept Verkerke’s
broad analysis while still concluding that strict vicarious liability is the
appropriate rule to impose in discriminatory harassment cases. As Professors
Schultz and Lawton have shown, discriminatory harassment typically draws on
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See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L. J. 656,
660-661 (1975).
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L. REV. 273 (1995).
123
See, e.g., id. at 279. In this regard, Professor Verkerke (in my view,
persuasively) rejects Alan Sykes’s argument, Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of
Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related
Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 606-608 (1988), that supervisory
harassment is caused by the enterprise in a way that coworker harassment is not.
See Verkerke, supra note 122, at 309-310.
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Verkerke, supra note 122, at 364-365.
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and even enforces a workplace culture of discrimination.125 In other words,
discriminatory harassment is typically “systemic” in the sense that Verkerke uses
the term.

Even on Verkerke’s analysis, then, strict vicarious liability is the

appropriate rule to apply in the run of cases.
Moreover, experience with the Faragher/Ellerth defense demonstrates that
it has not provided employers with an incentive to adopt effective policies to
prevent, detect, and stop harassment. Joanna Grossman has shown that the
Faragher/Ellerth regime “has overemphasized compliance with prophylactic
rules at the expense of effecting real change in preventing the problem of sexual
harassment in the workplace.”126 She argues that the regime rewards employers
“for paying lip service to the regime by enacting standard-issue policies and
procedures, regardless of whether those efforts actually reduce harassment or
compensate victims.”127 This is exactly the sort of misplaced reward that a
125

See Schultz, supra note 66; Lawton, supra note 66.
Grossman, supra note 25, at 4.
127
Id. at 3-4; see also Bagenstos, supra note 98, at 24-25 (“Under the prevailing
approach [in the lower courts], employers can avoid liability for harassment
simply by adopting and distributing policies that formally prohibit harassment
and creating a grievance process that allows an employee to file a complaint with
someone other than the individual who harassed her. This is true even absent
any indication that the process set up by the employer has been effective at that
or any other workplace.”); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The
Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 198 (2004)
(“[T]he lower federal courts have interpreted the elements of the affirmative
defense so as to reward employers for engaging in behaviors that have little
effect on the incidence of workplace harassment. The courts reward employers
for developing and distributing nicely worded harassment policies and
procedures and, in some cases, providing sexual harassment training to their
employees. The empirical literature does not support the federal courts'
assumption that paper policies and procedures, even when coupled with
training, deter sexual harassment in the workplace.”). For a recent empirical
assessment of courts’ application of the Faragher/Ellerth defense, which
126
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negligence rule sometimes creates but a strict liability rule avoids. 128

If

employers were required to internalize the costs of discriminatory harassment
perpetrated by their employees, they would have the incentive to adopt internal
polices that actually work to reduce harassment—rather than policies that simply
are likely to impress a judge or jury.
As for encouraging mitigation of damages, the Faragher/Ellerth defense
fails to provide appropriate incentives.

That is because of the interaction

between the way lower courts have applied the second prong of the defense and
the rules governing Title VII retaliation claims.

As Professors Brake and

Grossman have shown, lower courts tend to conclude that targets of harassment
have “unreasonably failed to take advantage of . . . preventive or corrective
opportunities,”129 and that their employers are therefore not liable, when they fail
to invoke their employers’ internal complaint procedures within a few days or
weeks from the first harassing incident.130 As they note, “[e]mployees who
experience harassment and then wait to see if harassing behavior continues or to
gather more evidence before complaining are often deemed unreasonable” by
the courts.131 But employees who complain at the first significant incident of
harassment may find themselves unprotected against retaliation.

Title VII’s

concludes that the courts are not applying the defense according to the terms set
forth by the Supreme Court (but is sympathetic to the courts for acting as they
do), see Zev J. Eigen, Nicholas F. Menillo & David S. Sherwyn, When Rules are
Made to Be Broken (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
128
See Lawton, supra note 127 (making this point).
129
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130
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Id. at 881.
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“opposition clause” prohibits employers from retaliating against workers who
complain about discrimination, but only if the workers “reasonably believe” that
the discrimination that they report violates the statute.132 Professors Brake and
Grossman describe a “plethora of court decisions” that have found “employees’
beliefs that they were opposing unlawful harassment to be unreasonable because
they complained of harassment too soon, before enough incidents had occurred
to create a hostile environment.”133
The intersection of these two doctrines places the targets of harassment on
the horns of a dilemma. They must “promptly report acts of harassment through
employer channels in order to preserve their right to later challenge the
harassment under Title VII,” but at the same time they “risk lawful retaliation by
employers if they complain too soon, before the offending conduct comes close
enough to an actionable hostile environment.”134 However employees respond to
this dilemma, it should be clear that the Faragher/Ellerth defense is not
appropriately encouraging the targets of harassment to mitigate damages.
Rather than relieving the employer of liability if the target of harassment failed to
complain in what a judge or jury later determines was a sufficiently prompt
fashion, the better way to encourage mitigation of damages is to have a strong,
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clear, and effective protection against retaliation. Harassment is an unpleasant
thing to experience—especially harassment that is “severe or pervasive enough
to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment.”135 Its targets have
ample incentive to take steps to end the abusive conduct even without a rule that
limits their recovery if they fail to complain. What stops many workers from
complaining is the understanding that if they complain they may lose their
jobs.136
When Congress takes up Justice Ginsburg’s invitation in Vance, then, it
should not limit itself to the narrow issue that was before the Court in that case.
Instead, it should adopt a rule of strict vicarious employer liability for any
unlawful harassment perpetrated by any employee, and it should abandon the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.

That defense was based on a set of

expectations—about how employers and employees would react to it, and about
how lower courts would apply it—that have not held true in practice. A rule of
strict vicarious liability, perhaps bolstered by a beefed-up antiretaliation regime,
is likely to serve the policies identified by the Faragher/Ellerth Court better than
the affirmative defense the Court created in those cases.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Vance exemplifies two of the key
critiques of formalism in law. But, more important for the future, it presents an
opportunity—an opportunity to rethink the entire approach to employer liability
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in workplace harassment cases that the Court adopted in Faragher and Ellerth.
That approach has failed to serve the Title VII policies that the Court itself
identified in those cases. It has not protected the targets of harassment against
retaliation, it has not encouraged employers to adopt effective policies to prevent
and address harassment, and it has not been necessary to encourage mitigation
of damages. Congress should take up Justice Ginsburg’s call to overturn Vance,
but it should not stop there.

Congress should adopt a general rule that

employers are liable for any discriminatory harassment in their workplaces that
is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter terms and conditions of employment.
That is the rule that best accommodates the Title VII policies that the Court itself
sought to implement in Faragher and Ellerth, but that the rule adopted in those
cases has failed to serve.
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